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LeClercq: Section 8(F) Prehire Agreements and the Exception to Majority Rep

SECTION 8(F) PREHIRE AGREEMENTS AND
THE EXCEPTION TO MAJORITY
REPRESENTATION: ARE CONSTRUCTION

WORKERS GETTING THE SHAFT?
Desir~e LeClercq*
Congress has neglected the federal labor rights of construction
workers for half a century.1 Back in 1959, Congress addressed the needs
of construction workers and attempted to ensure that those workers, who
were hired by construction employers for erratic and short periods of
time, retained the right to organize in unions.2 To that end, Congress
added section 8(f) to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),3

authorizing construction employers and unions to enter voluntarily into
prehire collective bargaining agreements covering construction
workers.4

Additionally, Congress

included a proviso permitting

" Desire LeClercq is a staff attorney for the National Labor Relations Board. The views expressed
herein do not necessarily represent the views of the agency or the United States.
1. Construction workers include those employees who work in the four sectors of the
construction industry: residential, commercial, industrial, and highway and heavy. See Steven G.
Allen, Developments in Collective Bargaining in Construction in the 1980s and 1990s, in
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 411, 412 (Paula B. Voos ed.,

1994).
2. See generally Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (stating the overall purpose of the National Labor Relations Act).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (2006). Section 8(f) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice . . . for an employer engaged primarily in the
building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged
(or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction
industry with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are
members . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been
established ... prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as
a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization . . . or (3) such
agreement requires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for
employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer
qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum
training or experience qualification for employment . . . Provided further, That any
agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a
bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title.
Id.
4. Id.
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employers to require, as a condition of employment, that their employees
join the 8(f) union within seven days from the start of work provided
that no state right-to-work laws were violated.5 To date, section 8(f) is
Congress' only exception to its requirement that the union obtain the
support of a majority of employees before bargaining with an employer.6
Section 8(f) has neither been modified nor critically reviewed by
Congress since its enactment in 1959.
Congress added section 8(f) when the 1950s construction industry
was characterized by local project agreements and bargaining
agreements that typically required that construction workers be hired
directly from a union's local hiring hall. 8 To the extent that this practice
remains prevalent7 in the industry, section 8(f) continues to provide a
vital exception to time-consuming union elections and permits
employees to be represented by their construction unions while working
on individual projects.
However, over the course of this half-century, the construction
industry has changed. The ad-hoc, disorganized framework initially
envisioned by the 1959 Congress no longer reflects reality. 8
Developments, including the use of national and area-wide agreements
over extensive periods of time, have meant that-at least
potentially-construction employers maintain a stable or diverse work
force not necessarily tied to a local union hiring hall.9 Similarly, the
National Labor Relations Board's ("Board") interpretations of section

5. Id.; accord 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006) (allowing states to retain their power to outlaw the
various forms of union security despite differing federal policies).
6.

See JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1036 (5th ed. 2006) ("Under conventional doctrine such an
employer would be guilty of an unfair labor practice by extending recognition to a minority union,
and any agreement executed under such circumstances would be invalid even if bargained for under
the erroneous but good faith belief that the employer was dealing with a majority union.").
7. See David J. Lowe, Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industry: Empty Promises or
Enforceable Rights?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1702, 1703 (1981).

8. See S. REP. 86-187, at 28 (1959) ("A substantial majority of the skilled employees in [the
construction] industry constitute a pool of... help centered about their appropriate craft union."); 2
HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 2157 n.315 (noting the Board's dilemma in finding hiring hall referral
systems lawful in the 1950s); Philip Ross, Origin of the Hiring Hall in Construction, 11 INDUS.

REL. 366, 367 (1972) ("[Clonstruction hiring halls [were] . . . largely adopted in the period
immediately preceding and following the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act."); see also infra pp. 13-14
(noting consideration by the 1950s Congress of construction industry's use of hiring halls). The
hiring hall is a prehiring employee referral system. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 643 (1976); see also infra Part Ill.
9. See generally Daniel Quinn Mills, Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining, in THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: BALANCE WHEEL OF THE ECONOMY 59, 65-71 (Julian E. Lange &

Daniel Quinn Mills eds., 1972) (discussing national and area-wide agreements in the context of the
construction industry).
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SECTION 8(F) PREHIRE AGREEMENTS

8(f) have changed over time.10 The Board now permits 8(f) agreements
to convert into much more permanent 9(a) agreements" based on the
contract language, alone, and authorizes them to renew automatically
upon expiration. Under the 2009 construction industry and Board
framework, therefore, section 8(f) permits construction employers to
enter into collective bargaining agreements with unions of their choice,
for whatever period of time the employers and unions choose, without
the construction employees ever receiving the opportunity to vote.12
This article discusses 8(f) prehire agreements and the developments
in the construction industry, and argues that section 8(f) should be
amended to reflect the construction industry's evolution. Part I of this
article provides a brief framework of the NLRA provisions regarding
union representation, and discusses the aspects of the construction
industry necessitating its unique prehire agreements. Part II discusses
the historical background and the legislative purposes of section 8(f),
and reviews the Board's initial interpretations of 8(f) agreements, in
which concerns of employee free-choice were assuaged by assurances of
employees loyal to their local hiring halls. Part III discusses recent
developments in Board law and bargaining in the construction industry,
and argues that these developments undermine Congress' initial
assumptions of employee support. Part IV contends that the purposes of
the NLRA are best served by amending section 8(f) to provide greater
flexibility to ensure employee free-choice, and proposes a four-part
amendment that will allow 8(f) agreements, under contemporary
construction bargaining, to continue providing construction workers the
benefit of union representation while ensuring that these workers
maintain their fundamental right to choose or refrain from union
representation.
I. THE UNION REPRESENTATION PROCESS AND CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY NON-CONFORMITY UNDER THE NLRA

Throughout the NLRA's history, Congress and the Board have
struggled to reconcile two oft-competing labor principles-labor
stability and employee free-choicel3--in attempts to strike a balance
10. Lowe, supranote 7, at 1702.
11. See infra pp. 5-7 (explaining 9(a) agreements in greater detail).
12. See infra Part III (c).
13. See, e.g., John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380 (1987), enforced
sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Board
argues that:
[W]hen Congress considered the 1959 amendments it recognized that application of the
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between keeping America's businesses and economy both functioning
and productive while also ensuring that employees
may band together
14
and bargain collectively if they so choose.
In making this balance, the NLRA has traditionally placed a high
premium on employees' rights to choose or refrain from choosing their
own labor representative. 5 Accordingly, section 7,16 the "heart" of the
NLRA, 17 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . .and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
. ,8
Further, section 9(a) requires that the employees' collective bargaining
representative be "designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of employees in a unit for such purposes...
pre-1959 Act to the construction industry would result in substantial instability in the
industry by the invalidation of established industry practices while at the same time
employees in the industry would be deprived of both the fruits of collective-bargaining
as well as the freedom to express their desires concerning union representation.
Id.; see also Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 585, 589 (2007) (Member Liebman,
dissenting) ("This balance of statutorily-recognized interests serves to protect the right of employees
to self-determination and to promote the interests of labor stability."); PSM Steel Constr., Inc., 309
N.L.R.B. 1302, 1304 (1992) ("PSM is correct in pointing to our concern for balancing the interests
of labor stability and employee free choice ....
");
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378 ("The principles
we advance today represent a more appropriate interpretation and application of Section 8(f), and
they will better serve the statutory policies of protecting labor relations stability and employee free
choice in the construction industry."); see generally S. REP. No. 74-573, at 1-3 (1935).
14. See generally Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging
of the NationalLabor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 587-88 (2007). While
citing recent Board decisions, the author argues that:
[T]he Board has stated expressly, for the first time, that the exercise of employee free
choice is superior in the statutory scheme to the stability of collective bargaining. This
elevation of one of two competing ideals in the Act undoes the delicate balance long
established in Board doctrine, and seems to signal a devaluing of what is unique about
this statute-the protection of collective rights.
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (guaranteeing employees the right to bargain collectively "through
representatives of their own choosing"); see also James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and
Card Check Recognition: Prospectsfor Changing Paradigms,90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 821 (2005);
Joseph E. Slater, Do Unions Representing a Minority of Employees Have the Right to Bargain
Collectively?: A Review of Charles Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
383, 387 (2005).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
17. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:
Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 270 (2002) (section 7 is the
"heart" of the NLRA); Lawrence D. Grewach, Comment, The Guards Trilogy: The NLRB Lowers
the Guard on Employee Rights, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 179-80 (1985) (section 7 is the
"cornerstone" of the NLRA); LEE MODJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE 98 (1983) ("Section 7 is the heart
of the Act"); JOSEPH ALTON JENKINS, LABOR LAW: ITS EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT FROM
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO PROTECTED RIGHTS AND MANDATORY DUTIES FOR UNIONS AND

MANAGEMENT ALIKE 63 (1968) (section 7 is the "guts" of the NLRA).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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Thus, a union must earn the support of a majority of employees

before it may represent them.2 °
Typically, in order for the union to earn the support of a majority of
the employees, the employer must have already hired a "substantial and
representative complement of its projected work force," and must be

engaged in "normal business operations."2 The union (i.e., the "9(a)
representative ' 22 or "9(a) union" 23) then campaigns for employee
support and the employees indicate their choice by voting either in a
24
Board-certified election, or more controversially, through authorization

cards.25 It is only after more than fifty percent or more of these
employees choose to be represented by a union that the employer and the
union may bargain regarding the terms and conditions of employment,
codified in a collective bargaining agreement ("9(a) agreement").26
19. Id. § 159(a).
20. It is a joint violation of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA (on the employer's part) and section
8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA (on the union's part) if an employer and union execute a collective
bargaining contract before the union has garnered the support of a majority of employees. See
Windsor Castle Health Care Facilities, 310 N.L.R.B. 579 (1993), enforced, 13 F.3d 619, 622 (2d
Cir. 1994); Haddon House Food Prods., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 338, 340 (1984), enforced, 764 F.2d 182
(3d Cir. 1985).
21. Hilton Inn Albany, 270 N.L.R.B. 1364, 1365 (1984); see also Dedicated Servs., Inc., 352
N.L.R.B. 753, 761 (2008).
Where a newly opened business has granted recognition, an issue concerning the timing
of recognition can arise. The Board has long balanced competing interests in these
cases. On the one hand, the Board seeks to vindicate the right of those employees,
already employed, to engage in collective bargaining should they so choose. On the
other hand, the Board seeks to have that choice made, not by a small, unrepresentative
group of employees, but by a group that adequately represents the interests of the
anticipated full complement of the unit employees-all of whom will be bound, at least
initially, by the choice of those who were hired before them.
Id. at 761-62.
22. See, e.g., Air Climate Sys., Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 622, 624 n.8 (2008) ("[T]he Union is the
9(a) representative of the unit employees .... "); Allied Mech. Servs., Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 662, 665
(2008).
23. E.g., Caterair Int'l, 322 N.L.R.B. 64, 65 (1996) ("[A]n affirmative bargaining order has
been the standard Board remedy for more than 50 years when an employer has refused to bargain
with an incumbent Section 9(a) union."); James Luterbach Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 980
(1994).
24. See29U.S.C. § 159(c).
25. See Brudney, supra note 15, at 823 (acknowledging employer resistance to card check
agreements owing to the charge that they "allow unions to exert undue pressure on individual
employees .... "); Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Card Check Recognition: New House
Rules for Union Organizing?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 247 (2008) ("Critics describe [card
checking] as anathema to basic democratic principles and accuse unions of wanting to deal from the
bottom of the deck to secure undeserved representation of employees."); see also N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 601 (1969); HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 752.
26. See, e.g., British Indus. Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1141 (1975); Lianco Container Corp.,
173 N.L.R.B. 1444, 1448 (1969); Englander Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1042 (1955) (employer
violated the Act by entering into a collective bargaining relationship with a union "at a time when
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27
This certification process can be extremely time-consuming.
Questions of unit and eligibility must be settled and campaigns for and
against unionization conducted before an election is held.28 Card check
campaigns may be even more time-consuming because the unions must
first have the time to organize the employees, to earn their trust and,
ultimately, their signature on an authorization card, and then try to

convince the employer to accept the signed cards as proof of majority.

Currently, when presented with cards, the employer may contest the
validity of the union's signed cards and demand a Board-certified
election. 9
The construction industry is recognized as the only industry unable

to conform to this time-consuming organizing framework. Its diverse
sectors,31 spanning from single-family houses to major airports and
the [employer] was not yet in production and had only a handful of employees ....");see also
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 195, 196 (1966); Lapeer Metal Prods. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1518,
1522 (1961).
27. See Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369,
381 (2001) ("Unions identify delay during the organizing process as a leading impediment to their
organizing efforts.").
28. See, e.g., Schneider Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1968) (en bane)
("The key factor in setting aside an election, whether by virtue of the conduct of the parties or of the
Board, is the failure of those in the bargaining unit to make their collective desire effective.");
Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118 (1982) ("A representation election is
often the climax of an emotional, hard-fought campaign ....");Carrom Div., Affiliated Hosp.
Prods., 245 N.L.R.B. 703, 707 (1979) ("[T]he Board has long recognized that elections are
vigorously contested and that emotions frequently run high .
); Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 221,224 n.6 (1962).
29. E.g., Audubon Reg'l Med. Ctr., 331 N.L.R.B. 374, 374 (2000) (union requested
recognition from the employer, who declined and demanded a Board-certified election); see also
Brudney, supra note 15, at 824-25 ("Employers, however, usually decline the union's request and
exercise their right to demand a representation election, in which they will urge their employees to
vote against unionization; the election is thus a contest challenging the union's assertion that it
enjoys majority support.").
30. See Allen, supra note 1, at 418; GERALD FINKEL, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 73 (1997) (noting the costs of holding representation elections in the
construction industry proved "staggering"); HERBERT R. NORTHRUP, ROBERT E. WILLIAMS &
DOUGLAS S. McDOWELL, DOUBLEBREASTED OPERATIONS AND PRE--IIRE AGREEMENTS IN
CONSTRUCTION: THE FACTS AND THE LAW 5 (1987) [hereinafter DOUBLEBREASTED]; Ursula M.

McDonnell, Comment, Deference to NLRB Adjudicatory Decision Making: Has Judicial Review
Become Meaningless?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 653, 668 (1989) ("[B]ecause of the mobility of the
workers in the [construction] industry, elections were often impracticable.").
31. See FtNKEL, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that the construction industry includes mom-andpop stores operating next to multi-billion dollar construction conglomerates); Construction Industry
Collective BargainingAct of 1975: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Hearing on Collective
Bargaining Act] (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Labor)
(discussing the problem of high fragmentation in the construction industry based on the numerous
crafts).
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33
roads, are often characterized by seasonal 32 and cyclical fluctuations.
Therefore, construction workers have historically been employed on a
short-term,34 project-by-project basis,35 and may be laid off at the
conclusion of the project.36 As a result, it is nearly impossible for unions
to organize them.37

II. LEGISLATIVE

INTENT AND INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 8(F)

The nonconforming construction industry has been a problem for
Congress since the post-World War Era, when the demand for
38
construction increased dramatically along with construction costs.
Initially, in its "laissez faire" era,39 Congress reacted to the
fragmentation and ad hoc employment practices in the industry by
steadfastly ignoring them.40 However, by the early to mid-1950s, the
construction industry garnered widespread attention, as labor and
management lobbyists battled to control the developing construction
labor laws.4 1 Because Congress refused to regulate construction labor,

32. See DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 1;WILLIAM HABER & HAROLD M. LEVINSON,
LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BUILDING TRADES 11 (1956); M. R. LEFKOE, THE
CRISIS IN CONSTRUCTION: THERE IS AN ANSWER 43 (1970); DANIEL QUINN MILLS, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUCTION 15 (1972); Mills, supra note 9, at 59; McDonnell,
supra note 30, at 667-68.
33. See Lynne C. Lamy, Comment, Recent Developments in Construction Industry
Bargaining:Doublebreastingand PrehireAgreements, 53 MO. L. REV. 465, 465 (1988).
34. See Allen, supra note 1, at 412; Stephen Evans & Roy Lewis, Union Organisation,
Collective Bargainingand the Law: An Anglo-American Comparison of the Construction Industry,
10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 473, 478 (1989) ("[C]ollective bargaining in construction, with its typically
high labour turnover and brief periods of employment for particular crafts at any one site, is based
on the principles which significantly diverge from the norm."); McDonnell, supra note 30, at 66768.
35. See Lowe, supra note 7, at 1703.
36. See id.; LEFKOE, supra note 32, at 27; Richard Murphy, Note, Pre-HireAgreements and
Section 869 of the NLRA: Striking a Proper Balance Between Employee Freedom of Choice and
Construction Industry Stability, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1014, 1014 (1982).
37. See Lamy, supra note 33, at 468 (quoting David S. Barr & Craig Jacobson, The
Enforceability of Construction Industry Pre-hireAgreements After Higdon, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 517,
518 (1979)); McDonnell, supranote 30, at 668.
38. See Evans & Lewis, supra note 34, at 474; William Gomberg, The Construction Labor
Force, in THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: NEW ADAPTATIONS TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 61,

83 (William Gomberg & Larry M. Robbins eds., 1977) (noting that, at the time of publication,
"[c]ollective bargaining in the building trades [wa]s governed by the Taft-Hartley Act.").
39. See Evans & Lewis, supra note 34, at 477 (noting that the laissez-faire period was from
1935 to1947).
40. See Allen, supra note 1, at 418; MILLS, supra note 32, at 25 (discussing how the initial
provisions in the NLRA "affected construction very little").
41. See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 49 ("Although both management and labor groups had in
mind definite amendments to the NLRA during the early 1950s, neither side was able to generate
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42
the industry was faced with increasing strikes and work stoppages;
national unions became more organized at the expense of a localized
management.43 As a result, Congress took action.44

A. Legislative History of Section 8(
After initially declining to regulate it, 45 Congress authorized the
Board to exercise jurisdiction over the construction industry in its TaftHartley Amendments in 1947.46 Shortly thereafter, both management
and labor lobbyists petitioned Congress to further clarify and regulate a
construction industry struggling to adapt to increasing market
demands.47 Union corruption and unchecked power in the industry
became chief concerns as Congress adjusted to its novel position as
industry regulator.4 8
At the same time, however, Congress
acknowledged the "serious problems" of applying traditional principles
of federal labor law to the construction industry:
The problems of the building and construction industry under the TaftHartley Act have been the subject of considerable comment by
authorities in the field; and Congress in previous years has made
several attempts to correct the shortcomings of the act as applied to the
industry. The occasional nature of the employment relationship makes

much support for its proposals. It was not until 1957 that the issue of labor legislation again came
to the forefront.").
42. See generally id. (discussing the "stalemate years" when management and labor took
matters into their own hands in response to Congress' inaction).
43. See DONALD CULLEN & LOUIS FEINBERG, THE BARGAINING STRUCTURE IN
CONSTRUCTION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 9 (U.S. Dept. of Labor 1980) (noting that balance of

power has always been heavily weighted in favor of unions because, for the most part, contractor
associations are composed of small, undercapitalized employers).
44. See id. at 5.
45. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1945) ("It is apparent, as the record
discloses, that the operations [of the employer] are part of the building and construction industry,
one over which the Board does not customarily assert jurisdiction."); W.S. Bellows Constr. Co., 51
N.L.R.B. 820, 820 (1943) (noting that the board declines jurisdiction as it "would [not] effectuate
the policies of the Act.").
46. See United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81 N.L.R.B.
802, 804 (1949), enforced, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950) (citing Local 74, United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners of Am. (Watson's Specialty Store), 80 N.L.R.B. 533, 534 (1948), enforced, 181 F.2d
126 (6th Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 707 (1951)); S.REP. No.86-187, at 27 (1959), reprinted in 1959
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2344; see also Lowe, supra note 7, at 1705-06.
47. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 52 ("Testimony indicated that certain high officials
within these unions were engaged in misconduct 'ranging from embezzlement to illicit secret
profits."'); Ross, supra note 8, at 376-77.
48. See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 52 (discussing how congressional hearings "gradually
began to center on corruption in several strong unions").
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this industry markedly different from manufacturing and other types of
enterprise.
An individual employee typically works for many
employers and for none of them continuously. Jobs are frequently of
short duration, depending upon various stages of construction.'4

The Senate and House both agreed that Congress needed to curtail
union power abuses, and both also acknowledged that they needed an
additional union "sweetener" to win support for the legislation from
labor as well as management. 50 Each house of Congress proposed its
own "sweetener" bill.
The Senate proposed the Kennedy-Ervin bill, passed in 1959,
introducing the 8(t) prehire agreement virtually identical to the one
eventually adopted by Congress. 5 1 This proposal authorized employers
engaged primarily in the construction industry to enter into prehire
agreements with construction unions-as the employers and unions had
been doing up to that point unlawfully-before the union garnered
support from a majority of the employees. It further provided that, as
opposed to 9(a) agreements, 8(f) agreements would not serve as a
"contract bar" 53 to a subsequent petition from any union seeking an
election through the Board.54
The House disagreed with the Senate's proposal,55 instead
preferring a more restrictive amendment supported by the Eisenhower

49. S.REP. No. 86-187, at27 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2344; H.R. REP. No.
86-741, at 19 (1959).
50. See, e.g., Debra L. Willen, Regulation of Section 8() Contract Negotiations After the
NLRB's Decision in Deklewa, 4 LAB. LAW. 797, 800-801 (1988); Mark D. Meredith, Note, From
DancingHalls to Hiring Halls: Actors' Equity and the Closed Shop Dilemma, 96 COLuM. L. REv.
178,231 (1996).
51. S.505, 86th Cong. § 603(a) (1959).
52. S. 1555, 86th Cong. § 602(a) (1959); S. 1555, 86th Cong. § 702(a) (1959); see also
DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 84.
53. Once the 9(a) union and employer have agreed to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, that contract may serve as a "contract bar" to preclude potential challenges lodged by
the employer, a rival union, or employees for up to three years following certification of the union.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 290 n.12 (1972); Pick-Mount Laurel
Corp. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 476, 480 (3d Cir.1980) ("As a result of the contract-bar rule and the
presumption of majority status, under ordinary circumstances no challenge to the Union's status
could have been launched by the employer, employees, or a competing union during the pendency
of the contract in this case, which did not exceed three years."); VFL Tech. Corp., 329 N.L.R.B.
458, 460 (1999) ("[T]he key is the union's attainment of full 9(a) status as the employees' designated
representative, at which point the normal contract-bar rules apply ....");Gen. Cable Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962) ("Contracts for definite duration for terms up to 3 years will bar an
election for their entire period; contracts having longer fixed terms will be treated for bar purposes
as 3-year agreements and will preclude an election for only their initial 3 years.").
54. S.1555, § 702.
55. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong. § 702(b) (1959).
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Administration.56 This amendment permitted Board certification of
construction industry unions only after "joint petition by the employer
and union" was filed, and it required that the employer and union have a
history of prior collective bargaining.5 7 Additionally, it prohibited union
certification if "a substantial number of the employees in the unit in
question asserted that the union was not designated or selected as
bargaining agent by a majority of such employees." 58 This amendment
was designed to protect:
[T]he right of employees to be free of coercion in the selection of their
own bargaining representatives; the will of the employees in this
respect would be required to be evidenced by a history of prior
collective bargaining between the union and the employer and by the
absence of substantial objection on the part of the employees in the
59
bargaining unit ....
The Senate, in turn, disagreed with the House's bill, concerned that
requiring a prior history of collective bargaining would preclude new
industry employers from entering into agreement with unions under
section 8(f). 60 When the House and Senate finally squared off, they
presented a variety of competing political interests. 61 Employers needed
a steady pool of skilled labor and predictable labor costs, 62 but were
63
nevertheless concerned about unchecked union picketing and boycotts.
Construction unions needed to establish collective bargaining
relationships without resorting to time-consuming Board elections.64
65
Employees needed a voice regarding their representation.
Ultimately, Congress adopted the Senate's Kennedy-Ervin bill and

56. See Willen, supranote 50, at 800.
57. 105 CONG. REC. S5767 (1959) (statement of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959,

at 1082 (1959).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See 105 CONG. REC. H15541 (1959) (statement of Rep. Smith), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959,

at 1578 (1959). "This is a cynical attempt by certain employer associations to discriminate against
new businesses and contractors seeking to expand into new areas." Id.
61. See DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 81.
62. See id. at 5, 81; S. REP. No. 86-187, at 28 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N., at
2345; Timothy Volk, Note, PrehireAgreements in Construction Industry: The Deklewa Decision, 9
J.L. & CoM. 243, 245 (1989).
63. See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 55 ("Organized employers thus demanded further statutory
restrictions on union activities, especially picketing and boycotts.").
64. DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 81.
65. See id.
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incorporated it into its 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments.66 That
meant that Congress decided not to require a prior bargaining history nor
allow for a substantial number of employees to invalidate the agreement
based on their assertion that the union did not represent them.
Conceding that 8(f) prehire agreements were "not entirely consistent
with [prior] rulings of the NLRB" permitting bargaining only "after a
representative number of employees have been hired,, 67 Congress
reasoned that employee free-choice remained protected for three
reasons. 68 First, the nature of the construction industry required the
employers to utilize the union's hiring halls. 69 The construction workers
hired out of these halls would presumably support the same union that
had assigned them the work.7 ° Second, employees had an "escape
hatch" that allowed them to contest the union's majority status at any
time, even during the terms of the bargaining agreement, by filing an
election petition. 71 Third, employers, unions, and employees could
challenge prehire agreements,
because these agreements would not serve
72
as a "contract bar.,
As noted above, section 8(f) authorized employers and unions to
lawfully enter into collective bargaining agreements that were similar to
the unofficial agreements these parties commonly used7 3 before
Congress began regulating the industry.74 As such, section 8(0 merely
codified the informal construction bargaining practice already in place,
in which employers and unions bargained with one another directly
before employees on the project were hired. Importantly though, rather
than trusting the administration of prehire agreements to the Board,

66. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Star.
519(1959).
67. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 28 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2345.
68. See generally id. (discussing ways in which section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations
Act protects employee free choice); John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380-82
(1987) (discussing the legislative history and the structure of section 8(f)).
69. Labor-Management Reform Legislation: Hearing on S. 76, S. 505, S. 748, S. 1002, S.
1137 and S. 1311 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 86th
Cong. 136-37 (1959) (statement of Archibald Cox, Professor, Harvard Law School); S. REP. No.
86-187, at 28 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2345.
70. See Volk, supra note 62, at 256 ("Majority support could be presumed because the
employees came from a union hiring hall.").
71. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1380-81; DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 84.
72. SeeDeklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387.
73. See DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 81-82; James M. Wilton, Survey, Changed
Interpretation of Section 869 of the National Labor Relations Act: Mesa Verde Construction Co. v.
Northern California District Council of Laborers, 31 B.C. L. REV. 114, 116 (1989).
74. See Allen, supra note 1, at 418 ("Well before the Wagner Act, the prehire agreement was
the principal instrument to commit contractors to use union labor.").
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Congress regulated the issue itself.75
B. Board and Court Interpretations
Immediately following the passage of the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments, the Board enforced the terms of 8(f) prehire agreements,
binding the signatories to the agreement until expiration.76 Thus, neither
the employer nor union could abrogate the terms of their 8(f) agreement
while the agreement was in force. The Board soon shifted course,
however, and found that non-majority unions could enforce the terms of
the 8(f) agreements only if they had somehow "converted" into the
employees' 9(a) representatives before the agreements expired.77
1. Repudiation At-Will or Automatic Conversion
In

1971,

in

R.J. Smith

Construction Co. 78

and Ruttmann

Construction Co., the Board developed the conversion doctrine, in
which 8(f) agreements were viewed as predecessors to 9(a)
agreements. 80 Either party (most likely, the employer) could unilaterally
repudiate the 8(f) agreement, contending that the union lacked majority
However, the union could "convert" into the 9(a)
support. 8 1
representative during the terms of the 8(f) agreement if it filed "an unfair
labor practice charge claiming: (1) that the prehire relationship had
converted into a full 9(a) relationship; and (2) that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice by failing to treat it as such. 82 If the
Board determined that the union in fact enjoyed majority support, the
union would be held retroactively as the employees' 9(a) representative,
and after that "the employer could not lawfully repudiate the agreement
79

75. See Hearingon Collective BargainingAct, supra note 31, at 1 (statement of Sen. Harrison
A. Williams, Jr, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Labor) ("The construction industry is too important in
meeting our national housing and industrial needs to be left without a firm national labor policy
which is calculated to protect the rights of construction tradesmen, while promoting stability and
continuity within the industry.").
76. See Lowe, supra note 7, at 1708.
77. See id. at 1708-09; Wilton, supranote 73, at 115.
78. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971).
79. 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971).
80. See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 1037; Brian A. Caufield, Reversion to Conversion? The
Board's Interpretation of the Interplay Between Sections 8(l) and 9(a) in the Construction Industry,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 413, 420 (2006); Volk, supra note 62, at 248.
81. E.g., McWhorter Trucking, 273 N.L.R.B. 369, 370-77 (1984); Hageman Underground
Constr., 253 N.L.R.B. 60, 60 (1980); Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. at 701; R.J. Smith
Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. at 695; HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 1037; Volk, supra note 62, at 248.
82. Volk, supranote 62, at 249.
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or refuse to bargain with the union. 83
Once the Board found conversion, it determined the appropriate
employee unit based on the nature of the employer's work force.84 For
instance, if the employer hired its employees strictly on a "project by
project" basis, employing various employees at any given time, the
Board would find that the union enjoyed majority support only with
respect to those specific employees covered under the project subject to
the agreement. 85 On the other hand, if the employer retained a "stable
and permanent work force," (i.e., the same employees who worked on
various projects over extended periods of time) the Board would find
that the union was the 9(a) representative for all of the employees,8 6 and
the employer thereafter had to recognize the union as the 9(a)
representative at existing and future job sites.8 7
The Supreme Court accepted the Board's new conversion doctrine
seven years later in NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, InternationalAss 'n
of Bridge Workers (Higdon),8 8 although it found that the Board's
interpretation of 8(f) was not the only defensible one. 89 The Supreme
Court subsequently reaffirmed its agreement that 8(f) agreements were
voidable by either party at will, barring 9(a) conversion, in Jim McNeff
Inc. v. Todd.90
2. Deklewa: the Board's Change of Mind
The Board's conversion doctrine was sharply criticized. Unions
and some appellate courts complained that the doctrine permitted
employers to abrogate their contractual obligations. 9' Employers, in
turn, complained that neither the Board, the courts, nor the Supreme
Court provided specific indicators of conversion; 92 rather, the judicial
body (the Board or courts) found conversion only after the parties
litigated the issue, and it applied, retroactively, the converted 9(a) status
83. Id. at 248.
84. Id. at 249.
85. Id. (citing Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977)).
86. Id. (citing Const. Erectors, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 786 (1982)).
87. Id.
88. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
89. Id. at 341.
90. 461 U.S. 260, 269 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 87
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, Higdon, 434 U.S. at 352; John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B.
1375, 1377 (1987) ("The AFL-CIO, its Building and Construction Trades Department, and the
Teamsters argue that the Board to should overrule R. .J Smith and abandon the conversion
doctrine."); Lowe, supra note 7, at 1718.
92. See Volk, supra note 62, at 250.
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93
to whichever point in time it deemed conversion had occurred.
Conceding that its conversion doctrine "exposed significant
deficiencies" that created "administrative and litigational difficulties,"
the Board overruled its own doctrine in Deklewa in 1989. 94 In Deklewa,
the Board found that the terms of 8(f) agreements would be as
enforceable as those in 9(a) agreements.95 Thus, the Board no longer
required the union to have achieved majority status prior to binding the
employer to the bargaining agreement. Further placing 8(f) agreements
on equal ground with 9(a) agreements, the Board reversed its
"bifurcated" approach to determining appropriate bargaining units (i.e.,
distinguishing between "project by project" and "stable work" forces).9 6
Although the Board acknowledged that "Congress described the
construction industry generally as one that hires employees on a projectit would no longer distinguish
by-project basis,, 97 it decided that
98
between those types of work forces.
While the Board overruled its conversion doctrine and made 8(f)
agreements resemble 9(a) agreements with respect to enforceability, it
also established several important distinctions between 8(f) and 9(a)
agreements. 99 First, the Board established that the enforceable 8(f)
contract rights would only be "coextensive with the bargaining
agreement that is the source of its exclusive representational
authority."' 00 Therefore, the employers would have no bargaining
obligations after the agreement's expiration.' 0 ' The Board reasoned that,
absent an election, the signatory union enjoyed no presumption of
majority support and either party was free to repudiate the 8(f)
relationship upon expiration of the bargaining agreement. 102 This
distinction between 8(f) and 9(a) is significant, 10 3 because the parties in a
9(a) agreement have a continuing duty to bargain, even after the
expiration of their agreement. 104

93. See id. at 248-50.
94.

Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377-80.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1382.
Id.

Id. at 1385.

See id. at 1377-78.
Id. at 1387.
101. Id. at 1388.
102. Id. at 1386.
103. See Madison Indus., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 (2007) ("The distinction between a
union's representative status under Section 8(f) and under Section 9(a) is significant because an 8(f)
relationship may be terminated by either the union or the employer upon the expiration of their
collective-bargaining agreement.").
104.

Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac. 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 721 (2001) (quoting United States
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Second, the Board reaffirmed that, unlike 9(a) agreements, 8(f)
agreements would not act as a contract bar. 10 5 In doing so, the Board
relied heavily on 8(f)'s legislative history and Congressional intent, 10 6 in
which Congress sought to preserve employee free-choice by specifying
that 8(f) agreements would not bar an election petition during its
terms. 10 7 Then, once a Board election was held, a vote in favor of the
signatory union or a rival union "will result in that union's certification
' 8 Further, a
and the full panoply of Section 9 rights and obligations."10
vote against union representation would void the 8(f) agreement and
terminate the 8(f) relationship between the employer and union,
prohibiting those parties from reestablishing an 8(f) agreement for one
109
year.
As often occurs, the heart of the Board's decision was relegated to
the footnotes. 123 The Board acknowledged, in footnote forty-five, that it
was requiring the employees to use the Board's election processes to
repudiate the 8(f) agreement during its terms, conceding that this
requirement appeared to contradict Congress' view that section 8(f) was
necessary "because of difficulties in conducting the Board elections in
the construction industry."1' 0 However, argued the footnote, this rule
was not "undermined" by Congress' concerns, because Congress was
focused mainly on the "pre-hire" stages of the 8(f) relationship, and the
requirement here invoked the election processes after the employment
relationship was established.1 ' Further, the Board found that "since
1959 the Board has gained substantial expertise and developed detailed
procedures for conducting elections in the construction industry" such
that the Board could
"accommodate short-term and sporadic
12
employment patterns."'
III. THE NEW CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS:
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' FREE CHOICE ABANDONED

When section 8(f) was enacted in 1959, Congress envisioned local
construction firms bargaining with unions in a project-by-project

Gypsum
105.
106.
107.

Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964, 966 (1950)).
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1386.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1381.

108. Id. at 1385.
109. Id.
110.
111.
112.

See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1386 n.45.
Id.
Id.
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industry." 3 It further assumed that the local construction workers, hired
directly from the union's hiring halls to work on specific projects, would
support the unions that had hired them out. l4 To ensure that
construction workers retained their right to choose their own
representatives, the Board clarified in Deklewa that the 8(f) bargaining
relationship would expire along with the 8(f) agreement.' 15 The Board
was convinced that, if all else failed, the employees had an "escape
hatch" in which they could choose to decertify the union through the
Board's election procedures at any point in the bargaining
relationship. " 16
A. Post-Deklewa: the Erosion of Distinctions
Immediately following Deklewa, the Board diligently policed its
new 8(f) principles, consistently finding that unions could not convert
from 8(f) representatives into 9(a) representatives by their conduct
alone.' 17 Eventually, however, the Board found that construction unions
could nevertheless convert into 9(a) representatives during the 8(f)
agreement's terms assuming certain criteria were met. 1 8 In Pierson
Electric, Inc. (Golden West Electric),' 9 the Board found that an 8(f)
union could achieve 9(a) status under a voluntary agreement with the
employer-without a Board election or card check--by establishing that
the union expressly demanded 9(a) recognition and that the employers
voluntarily granted such recognition, "based on a contemporaneous
showing of union support among [the] majority of employees in an
appropriate unit."' 120 Thus, in order to become the 9(a) representative,
the union essentially had to take the same steps it would have taken
absent the 8(f) agreement: it had to demand recognition from the
employer based on evidence
that it currently enjoyed the support of a
12
majority of the employees. 1
The policed line between 8(f) and 9(a) began to disappear,
however, as the Board's requirement of a "contemporaneous showing"
of majority support and demand for recognition gave way to an
113.

See id. at 1382; S.REP. NO. 86-187, at 28 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2345.

114. See Volk, supra note 62, at 263 ("One reality is that usually the employees hired under a
prehire arrangement will support the union as their bargaining representative.").
115.

See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1381.
See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 1042.
See id.
307 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1992).
Id. at 1495.
Id.
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increasingly broad definition of "contemporaneous.' 22 In Goodless
Electric Co. (Goodless ),123 the employer and the union signed an 8(f)
agreement stating that if a majority of the unit employees "authorize the
Local Union to represent them in collective bargaining, the Employer
will recognize the Local Union as the NLRA Section 9(a) collective
bargaining agent ... ,124 One year later, however, the employer
indicated its intent to terminate the 8(f) relationship upon expiration of
the agreement. 12 In response, the union obtained signed authorization
cards from the employees authorizing the union to represent them in
bargaining.126 The Board found that the union had unequivocally
demanded recognition as the 9(a) bargaining representative (a
"continuing request") 2 and that the employer, in the above provision,
28
had voluntarily accepted such demand.
The First Circuit reversed and remanded the decision back to the
Board, finding that, under Deklewa and its progeny, the one-year hiatus
between the 8(f) agreement and the union's acquisition of the
authorization cards did not satisfy the requirement of a
"contemporaneous" showing of majority support, demand and
recognition. 129 Surprisingly, in Goodless Electric Co. (Goodless II1),13 °
the Board rebuked the First Circuit and reaffirmed its initial holding on
remand, finding that the "prospective 9(a) recognition clause" in the 8(f)
agreement was sufficient to "trigger the employer's contractual
obligation to grant 9(a) recognition to the union."'13' Not amused, the
court reversed the Board's decision yet again, finding that "the Board
has chosen
to ignore our earlier ruling and disregard the law of the
32
case."'

1

The Board did not let the court's disapproval change its direction,
and it has subsequently relaxed further the line between 8(f) and 9(a)
agreements. 133 In 2001, in Staunton Fuel & Material,Inc.,' 34 the Board
122. See id. at 1496.
123. 321 N.L.R.B. 64 (1996).
124. Id.
125.

Id.

126. Id.
at 66.
127. Id.
128. Id.
124 F.3d 322, 329-30 n.8 (lst Cir. 1997).
129. NLRB v. Goodless Elec. Co. (Goodless 11),
130. 332 N.L.R.B. 1035 (2000).
131. Id. at 1038.
132. NLRB v. Goodless Bros. Elec. Co. (Goodless IV), 285 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2002).
133. See, e.g., Reichenbach Ceiling & Partition Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 125, 126 (2001) ("[A]s to
this contemporaneous showing the Board has held that an employer's acknowledgment of such
majority support is sufficient to preclude a challenge to majority status."); Hovey Elec., Inc., 328
N.L.R.B. 273, 274 (1999) (permitting the union "to convert the 8(f) agreement to a 9(a) agreement
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held that a union may establish 9(a) status solely through the terms of a
written agreement:
[W]here the language unequivocally indicates that (1) the union
requested recognition as the majority or 9(a) representative of the unit
employees; (2) the employer recognized the union as the majority or
9(a) bargaining representative; and (3) the employer's recognition was
or having offered to show,
based on the union's having shown,
35
evidence of its majority support.1

the Board has dropped its "contemporaneous"
Since Staunton Fuel,
136
requirement all together.
Recently, in Allied MechanicalServices, Inc.,'37 the Board held that
a union was the employees' 9(a) representative, and not the 8(f)
representative as contended by the employer.' 38 It based this holding, in
part, on the language of an informal settlement agreement between the
union and employer stipulating that the employer would "'recognize
and, upon request, bargain' with [the union] 'as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the [unit] employees.' ' 1 39 The parties engaged in
bargaining but never reached agreement. 140 Shortly thereafter, the
employer withdrew recognition, stating that the parties had an 8(f)
relationship that it was free to terminate. 14 The Board found otherwise,
finding that "the bargaining relationship established by settlement of the
complaint logically would be premised on the notion that [the union]
represented a majority of unit employees" and that "the settlement
agreement incorporated language indicative solely of a 9(a)
relationship."'

142

The Board now permits construction employers and unions to enter
into 8(f) agreements, and convert those into 9(a) agreements, voluntarily
based on the language of the agreements.1 43 Accordingly, Deklewa's
at any time in the future" based on a clause in the agreement).
134. 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001).
135. Id. at 720.
136. See, e.g., Saylor's, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 330, 331 (2002) (Member Cowen, dissenting) ("I
would adopt the Goodless Electric criteria for obtaining 9(a) status with the additional requirement
.
that... the 'contemporaneous showing' of majority status .
137. 351 N.L.R.B. 79(2007).
138. Id. at 82.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 80.
141. Id. at 81.
142. Id. at 82.
143. See id. at 83 (finding that the language of the 8(f) agreement imposed obligations upon the
employer reminiscent of a 9(a) agreement and, thus, converted the agreement into a 9(a)
agreement); Madison Indus., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1308 (2007) (finding that the "agreement will
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assurance that the 8(f) bargaining relationship would expire with the 8(f)
agreement has eroded with time:
the parties may currently contract into a
144
relationship.
9(a) bargaining
Concurrently, however, the Board steadfastly enforces the Deklewa
principle that, during the terms of the 8(f) agreements, employers may
not exit the agreement, or abrogate their terms, in the absence of a
Board-certified election. 45 In Precision Striping, Inc.,146 for example,
the employer "conducted a secret ballot poll of its unit employees, who
voted four to one against union representation ....,147 The employer
accordingly refrained from bargaining with the union under its
contention that the union did not enjoy the support of a majority of its
employees. 148 Finding the employer's refusal to bargain unlawful, the
Board noted
that the employer "never petitioned the Board for an
9
election."

14

B. Developments in Construction Collective Bargaining
Along with the Board's enforcement of 8(f) agreements, described
above, bargaining in the construction industry has experienced other
fundamental changes over the past few decades.15 ° These changes
include: (1) the structure of construction employers' bargaining (2) the
structure of construction collective bargaining agreements; and (3) the
composition of the construction workers. 15 1 These changes are
important because they establish that Congress' initial assurances of
employee support no longer necessarily hold true.
First, the structure of construction bargaining has become, in many

be independently sufficient to establish a union's 9(a) representation status" where the agreement
satisfies the three requirements (citing Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 717, 719-20
(2001))).
144. See, e.g., Pierson Elec., Inc. (Golden West Electric), 307 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1494 (1992)
("[The relationship between a union and a construction industry employer will be presumed to be
governed by Section 8(1) unless the Union shows it is the 9(a) majority representative of the
employees in question.").
145. See Precision Striping, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1112 (1987) ("Deklewa requires a Board
election (that a union loses) before an employer may lawfully repudiate an 8(f) agreement." (citing
John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1385 (1987))).
146. Id.at 110.
147. Id. at 1112.
148. Id. at 1110.
149. Id. at 1112.
150. See David Weil, The Contemporary Industrial Relations System in Construction:
Analysis, Observationsand Speculations, 46 LAB. HIST. 447, 464 (2005).
151. See generally id. at 464-66 (discussing fundamental changes within the construction
industry over the past few decades).
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respects, more organized. In the 1960s, construction unions bargained
collectively through seventeen national unions. 152
Alternatively,
construction employers bargained individually, they focused on a single
craft or specialty area, and were otherwise separated from one
another. 53 To remedy their bargaining disadvantage, 154 construction
employers began to likewise organize in the early 1970s.155 Since then,
these employers have bargained increasingly through local and national
contractors associations 156 or multi-employer associations.157 Although
individual bargaining certainly remains a viable option for construction
employers, many employers now have representatives
of contractors'
158
associations replace them at the bargaining table.
Second, the structure of the construction industry's collective
bargaining agreements (i.e., the products of the above bargaining) has
evolved. The individual, local project agreements resulting from local
bargaining have been replaced in part by area-wide or national
agreements.159 The agreements cover all projects performed by the
signatories within the specified geographic location, 160 typically for

152. See Hearing on Collective Bargaining Act, supra note 31, at 38 (statement of John T.
Dunlop, Secretary of Labor of the United States) (discussing the seventeen national unions affiliated
with the building and construction trades department of the AFL-CIO and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters).
153. See FINKEL, supra note 30, at 54; CULLEN & FEINBERG, supranote 43, at 17 (referring to
dissension among the individual types of contractors contributed to instability in the construction
industry and permitted unions to have a bargaining advantage).
154. See CULLEN & FEINBERG, supra note 43, at 18 (explaining that unions had an edge over
construction contractors because they were organized and able to bargain as a "single voice.").
155. See Allen, supra note 1, at 420 (discussing the origins of national contractors
associations).
156. For example, membership in the Associated General Contractors of America, one of the
largest national contractor's associations, rose in 2007 and 2008. Telephone interview with Denise
S. Gold, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. (Oct. 23, 2008) (on file with
author); Membership Report, Denise S. Gold, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. (Oct. 23, 2008) (on file with author); see also CULLEN & FEINBERG, supra note 43, at 21.
157. A multi-employer bargaining association is a group of employers that bargain as one unit
with the union or unions that represent their employees. These associations are legal under the
NLRA. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 409 (1982). Also, They
are now common in the construction industry. See, e.g., Ehredt Underground, Inc. v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 90 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1996).
158. See MILLS, supra note 32, at 28 ("Collective bargaining agreements in construction are
normally negotiated between a local union in a single craft and an association of contractors who
employ men of that craft.").
159. See id. ("The agreement normally covers a geographic area (the geographic jurisdiction of
the local) and specific types of work operations (the work jurisdiction of the craft)."). It is not clear
to what extent area-wide agreements have replaced individual project agreements. See also Mills,
supra note 9, at 69.
160. See Mills, supra note 9, at 69; Weil, supra note 150, at 465 (noting a recent "shift in focus
of competition to a regional/national rather than local basis in many sectors."): see, e.g., US
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1 61

automatically-renewable

three-year terms.162

Finally, the composition of the construction work force covered by
these collective bargaining agreements has become more diverse. Since
at least the 1980s, fewer collective bargaining agreements stipulate that
163
all subcontractors in a project will be selected from unionized firms.
This is due, at least in part, to the construction industry's replacement of
general contractors-who directly employed the construction workers
and ensured the exclusive hiring of union workers-with construction
managers who merely contract with basic trades. 164 As a result,
construction unions have been less able to establish "wall-to-wall"
agreements exclusively permitting union workers on the sites,1 65 and
construction managers have had greater flexibility
to seek labor from
166
both unionized and nonunionized contractors.
C. Legal Implications: Section 8() 's Failureto Adapt to a Changing
Industry
Section 8(f)'s assurances that employees will not be subjugated to
unelected representation are undermined both by the Board's
increasingly liberal view that 8(f) agreements may convert into 9(a)
agreements, 67 and by the Board's dropped distinction between
individual project agreements and area-wide agreements.168 Section 8(f)
also fails to contemplate the contemporary construction industry, which
has become more national and organized over the past fifty years. By
failing to account for these changes, section 8(f) does not protect the
labor rights of construction workers as presupposed by the 1959
Congress.

Reinforcing, Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 404, 405 (2007) ("Redmond, acting for Reinforcing, executed the
area agreement between the Unions and the Upstate Iron Employers Association, covering the
period May 1, 2003, through April 30, 2006.").
161. HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 1049.

162.
163.

See MILLS, supranote 32, at 28.
Weil, supra note 150, at 452.

164. Id.; see also Stephen L. Bulzomi & John L. Messina, Jr., Washington's Industrial Safety
Regulations: The Trend Towards Greater Protectionfor Workers, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.

315, 339 (1994) ("[l]n construction there has been a recent trend towards hiring 'construction
managers,' rather than general contractors."); Lawrence Ponoroff, Construction Claims in
Bankruptcy: Making the Best of a Bad Situation, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 345 n.5 (1995) ("An

alternative model which has gained some measure of popularity in recent years is to substitute a
construction manager for a general contractor.").
165.

Weil,supra note 150, at 452.

166. Id. at 455.
167.
168.

Wilton, supra note 73, at 117.
John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1379 (1987).
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First, considering the developments in construction bargaining and
the composition of the work force it is apparent that area-wide
agreements, over an extended period of time, may encompass a broad
composition of construction employees. These employees, contrary to
Congress' initial assumption, 69 have not necessarily been hired out of
the union's hiring hall. 70 For example, construction managers may have
hired both union and nonunion employees for different projects within
the defined geographic area.' 7 ' Or, over an extended period of time,
construction firms may have employed the same local employees 172 who
they transfer from job to job,1 73 and who make up the employer's stable
work force.175174 These employees are tied to the employer, not necessarily
the union.
Employees tied to a construction employer, rather than to the union,
may not necessarily support a union that the employer has chosen for
them. A recent case highlights how these employees can be deprived of
their right to choose their own representative under broad 8(f)
agreements. 176 In Garner/Morrison,LLC, 77 the construction employer
hired its employees locally and then immediately entered into a three-

169. Academics that supported Deklewa used this assumption of majority support to contend
that 8(f) unions had, in reality, majority status. See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 7, at 1714; Volk, supra
note 62, at 259.
170. See, e.g., Gamer/Morrison, LLC, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 27, 2009)
(stating that the employer hired its painters and tapers locally and then entered into an 8(t)
agreement with a construction union); Murphy, supra note 36, at 1024 ("[Congress' presumption of
majority support in 8(f) agreements] does not apply to a stable work force employer because the
employer, rather than hiring from a union hiring hall, merely contracts with a union that then acts on
behalf of employees already retained by the employer.").
171. See Allen, supra note 1, at 433; DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 4.
172. Dale Belman & Paula B. Voos, Union Wages and Union Decline: Evidence from the
ConstructionIndustry, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 67, 72 (2006) ("Even when the contractors hire
directly, they usually use local sources .... ").
173. See, e.g., United Steel Workers of Am., Local 14693, 345 N.L.R.B. 754, 758 (2005)
("The Employer had 40 to 50 employees on the job, all of whom were represented by the
Respondent and most of whom were members of the Respondent."); Gimrock Constr., Inc., 344
N.L.R.B. 1033, 1034 (2005); Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 3 (Specialty Crushing, Inc), 331
N.L.R.B. 369, 371 (2000) ("Pursuant to project agreements and subcontractor clauses, the Union
has referred union workers to the Employer for work on covered jobsites. Apparently, employees
so referred have continued to work for the Employer on nonunion jobsites.").
174. See Weil, supra note 150, at 464 ("[Current construction industry operations] differ[]
markedly from the situation present through much of the last century where building trade unions
played a role throughout a construction worker's time in the trades, from offering initial training in
apprentice classes, to helping them find work, to providing for retirement security."); Murphy,
supra note 36, at 1024.
175. See, e.g., Garner/Morrison,353 N.L.R.B. at 2.
176. See, e.g., id.
177. Id. at 1.
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year, area-wide 8(f) agreement with the Painters Union. 78 Before the
terms of the agreement expired, however, the employer became
disenchanted with the Painters Union and determined that the Carpenters
Union was the better alternative. 179 Two months before the Painters
Union's 8(f) agreement expired, a majority of employees signed
authorization cards designating the Painters Union as their 9(a)
representative. 180 The employer did not accept these authorization
cards' 81 and, one day after the bargaining agreement expired, directed its
employees to meet with the Carpenters Union. 82 Disregarding the
choice of its employees, the employer ultimately signed a bargaining83
agreement, covering those employees, with the Carpenters Union.
Because the employees were tied to the employer, and not to the union,
own preference for the
they remained with the employer despite their
84
Painters Union as their union representative.
Next, bargaining agreements with three-year terms and automatic
renewal clauses' 85 permit employers to easily renew 8(f) agreements
without soliciting the approval of their employees.' 86 In fact, these 8(f)
agreements may renew automatically. 187 While the Board has refused to

178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at3.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id.(finding that the employer said he would consider granting the Painters 9(a)
recognition, but really he had no plans to grant them that status).
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at2-3.
184. Id. at 2 (stating the employer, Gamer/Morrison, hired employees and immediately entered
into the collective bargaining agreements with the Painters Union without the Painters first
obtaining majority support from the employees). The Board ultimately found that the employer
violated the NLRA, but on the grounds that the employer unlawfully assisted the Carpenters Union
by requiring its employees to attend a meeting with Carpenters representatives and by remaining in
the room while the employees were solicited, and signed, Carpenters' authorization cards. Id. at 56. Thus, the Board did not address the fact that the employer disregarded the employees' preference
for the Painters Union-the preference previously demonstrated when they signed Painters Union
authorization cards. Id. at 2.
185. See, e.g., Asbestos Workers Local No. 84 (DST Insulation, Inc.), 351 N.L.R.B. 19, 19 n.2
(2007) (providing an example of an automatic renewal clause which stated: "[t]his Agreement shall
become effective July 1, 2001, and shall be rigidly observed until its expiration, June 30, 2004, and
from year to year thereafter unless either party notifies the other ninety (90) days prior to expiration
of this contract in writing.").
186. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. McElroy's Inc., 500 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th
Cir. 2007) (explaining the agreement provided the employer the option of automatic renewal upon
expiration); James Luterbach Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 978 (1994) ("[Aln employer may,
however, obligateitself to abide by a successor agreement .... ).
187. See, e.g., Reliable Elec. Co., 286 N.L.R.B. 834, 836 (1987) ("Authorization continued
unless the [employer] subsequently took some action effectively withdrawing the multiemployer
group's authority to bargain on the [employer]'s behalf."); Thomas Riske, Note, Interest Arbitration
Clauses in §8(J) Pre-HireAgreements: Effective for Achieving Genuine Collective Bargaining or
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88
bind employers to subsequent 8(f) agreements based on mere inaction,'
it will bind an employer if the employer has committed any "distinct
affirmative act that would reasonably lead the union to believe that the
employer intended to be bound by the upcoming or current
negotiations."' 189 This "distinct affirmative act" involves compliance
with the previous agreements' terms. 190 Regardless of whether a
construction employer engages in this "distinct affirmative act," one
thing is clear: the construction employer may renew and, thereby, extend
the terms of its 8(f) agreements with a union without having to9 solicit
approval from its employees who are covered by the agreement.' '
While the employer may easily renew 8(f) agreements, the
employees' task of terminating the 8(f) agreement has proven difficult, if
not impossible. Again, Congress and the Deklewa Board felt assured
that employees had an "escape hatch" in the 8(f) framework (i.e., the
ability to decertify the union through Board elections), which ultimately

Enabling Parties to Underhandedly Gain Majority Bargaining Power?, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 333,
341 (2008) (finding that upon expiration of the agreement, automatical renewal is an alternative).
188. James Luterbach Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. at 980.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Cimato Bros., Inc., 352 N.L.RB. 797, 800 (2008) ("Whether particular conduct
in a given case demonstrates adoption of a contract is a question of fact."); DST Insulation, Inc., 351
N.L.R.B. at 20 ("DST adopted the terms of the 2004-2008 master agreement by its conduct. DST
adhered to significant substantive terms of the successor union contract, deliberately held itself out
as a union contractor, and obtained the benefits of a union contractor."); Cab Assocs., 340 N.L.R.B.
1931, 1932 (2003) (finding that the was employer bound to the successive agreement, even though
it withdrew from the association, based on its compliance with certain agreement terms); E.S.P.
Concrete Pumping, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 711, 713 (1999); Dist. Council of Plasterers and Cement
Masons of N. Cal. (Marina Concrete), 312 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1105 (1993); Haberman Constr. Co., 236
N.L.R.B. 79, 87 (1978).
191. See, e.g., Williams Insulation Co., 344 N.L.R.B. 898, 898 (2005).
[T]he Respondent entered into [an 8(f)] collective-bargaining agreement whereby it
agreed to abide by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union
and the Heat and Cold Insulators Independent Contractors Asbestos Abatement,
Removal Contractors, effective for the period September 19, 1998, to September 18,
2001, whereby it recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the unit and agreed to continue the agreement in effect from year-toyear thereafter unless timely notice was given.
Id. See also R. L. Reisinger Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 915, 917 (1993) ("[I]t is clear the involved 8(f)
construction industry contract continued to automatically renew itself during those periods when
Respondent had, at most, a 'one man unit' because Respondent failed to repudiate the 8(f)
agreement during any of those periods of time.").
[U]nder the principles enunciated in Deklewa, in view of the Union's status as an 8(f)
bargaining representative, and the fact that the contract had been automatically renewed,
these actions of the Respondent were clear violations of its duty to bargain with the
Union unless, as the Respondent contends, there was no bargaining duty by reason of a
one-man unit.
Wilson & Sons Heating & Plumbing, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 802, 802 (1991).
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preserved the employees' free choice. 192 However, an assumption that
employees may "escape" from unwanted 8(f) representation through
Board elections first presupposes that the construction employees will
know they have the right to decertify the union, and will further know
how to do so. Even the Board has acknowledged that employees are not
necessarily equipped with this legal knowledge. 193 Moreover, unlike
9(a) relationships, where the employees have been exposed to the
Board's processes through a Board election or card check certification,
construction workers under an 8(f) agreement enter their employment
already represented by the 8(f) union.' 94 Further, assuming that the
employees are discontented with their 8(f) union, but the employer is
not, it is unlikely that either the 8(f) union or the employer will assist the
employees in gaining the necessary information to terminate their
negotiated bargaining agreement.
Finally, assuming that somehow discontented construction workers
successfully learn of and enforce their rights to demand a decertification
election, one obvious problem remains: Board-certified elections still
take a lot of time. 95 Again, section 8(f) was enacted under the
assumption that prehire agreements would cover such a short time that
Board elections would be either impossible or unnecessary. 196 It is,
therefore, counterintuitive to require the employees wishing to terminate
this agreement to go through the very time-consuming procedure in the
tail-end of bargaining deemed impossible at the front-end. The Board
acknowledged this tension in Deklewa, but merely found that Congress
was concerned only with the "pre-hire" stages of the industry. 9 7 This
finding, however, nearly assures construction workers that, once hired,
their representation preferences are no longer protected. The Board also
found that "since 1959 the Board has gained substantial expertise and
developed detailed procedures for conducting elections in the
construction industry."' 98 However, the Board has failed to make use of
its newfound "substantial expertise," ostensibly making elections
possible in the industry, and undermining the very need for prehire
192.
193.

John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1381 (1987).
See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 941, 941 (2001) ("Although experienced

labor lawyers may know about the ...right to file a UD petition, it is unrealistic to expect that [the
employee] would know of these rights.").
194. See, e.g., Gamer/Morrison, LLC, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 27, 2009).
195. See DOUBLEBREASTED, supra note 30, at 101 (noting that by the time decertification
process is completed, the project will have been finished).
196. S. REP. No. 86-187, at 28 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2345; H.R. REP.
NO. 86-741, at 19 (1959).
197. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1386 n.45.
198. Id.
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agreements. 199 The construction industry either affords the time for
elections and bargaining or it does not: the Board should not have it both
ways.
In sum, there is a disconnect between the direction the Board has
taken with 8(f) agreements--making them increasingly easy to enter into
yet remaining difficult to terminate-and the direction that bargaining in
the construction industry has taken, in which employees covered by the
8(f agreement are not necessarily loyal to the local union and hiring
hall. This disconnect undermines the construction employees who, as
members of the bargaining unit, have been left with no choice.
Concededly, there is no current data to prove the extent that 8(f)
agreements are used on a national, long-term basis, rather than
individual-project basis. However, one may infer that the use of national
8(o agreements has increased as membership in national contractors
associations continues to expand.
Further, the Board has been
confronted with cases such as Garner/Morrison, illustrating that
construction employers may, and in fact do, maintain local and stable
work forces that are thereafter deprived of the fundamental right to
select their own union representation under these national 8(f)
agreements. 200 As long as an employee's right to choose its union
representation remains the heart of labor law, section 8(f) needs to be
amended to take into account the contemporary industry and the
possibilities of abuse.

IV. SECTION 8(F) REFORMATION: GIVING CONSTRUCTION WORKERS

CHOICE

Federal labor law aims to strike a balance between industrial
stability and employee free choice.2 °' With respect to the latter,
employees may freely choose to be represented by the union that
employers and unions voluntarily select for them; 20 2 this article does not
intend to suggest otherwise.
Construction unions remain vitally
important to construction workers.20 3 They provide a collective voice in

199. Id. at n.46.
200. See Gamer/Morrison, LLC, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 27, 2009).
201. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378; Willen, supra note 50, at 807.
202. See generally Willen, supra note 50, at 807 (stating that employees may voluntarily enter
into a relationship with a union and that they may change their union representation at any time by
going through the Board's election procedures).
203. See generally Lowe, supra note 7, at 1703-04 (explaining that the union provides stability
to construction workers in an unstable industry by acting as an employment agency and a
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an otherwise fragmented industry, help the workers achieve higher
wages 20 4 and better working conditions, 20 5 and provide training through
their apprenticeship programs that are currently unrivaled in the nonunion sectors.20 6 Further, construction unions continue to serve as the
employees' employment agency through the continuing use of union
hiring halls.20 7
However, federal labor law has always placed a high premium on
the employees' free choice-not on that of the employer or union-by
requiring that a majority of the employees support their bargaining
To that end, Board elections and preelection
representatives. 208
procedures have always been highly regulated, and the Board and
Congress have grappled with ensuring a fair forum for the employees to
express their representation designations.0 9
A. A Callfor Change
In 1959, Congress, in section 8(f), authorized its one exception to
majority support, in the construction industry. 210 The construction
industry, however, has changed since then and the presumptions
supporting current 8(f) agreements are sagging with age. Just as
Congress initially determined that it should regulate prehire agreements
in the 1959 construction industry,211 it is only fitting for Congress to now
amend section 8(f) to protect construction workers in the contemporary
industry.21 2 Currently, politicians, management, and labor are lobbying
Congress regarding new labor legislation entitled the Employee Free
Choice Act ("EFCA"),2 13 which would, among other things, require the
employer to recognize and bargain with a union based on 9(a)

representative in collective bargaining negotiations).
204. See Belman & Voos, supra note 172, at 67.
205. See Lowe, supra note 7, at 1704.
206. See Allen, supra note 1, at 422; Belman & Voos, supra note 172, at 69; Weil, supra note
150, at 465-66 ("The growth of the nonunion sector and the emergence of large and sophisticated
contractors have not thus far generated an alternative solution to the skill problem.").
207.
208.
209.

See Lowe, supra note 7, at 1703-04.
See suprapp. 5-7.
See HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 473.

210. Lowe, supra note 7, at 1717 (citing S. REP. No. 86-187, at 55-56 (1959)).
211. See id.
212. See generally Abigail Evans, Note, Cooperation or Co-optation: When Does a Union
Become Employer-Dominated Under Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 100

COLUM. L. REv. 1022, 1059 (2000) ("[T]he modification of labor legislation is most appropriately
undertaken in the democratic processes of the legislature, not left up to the executive discretion of
the NLRB or the judicial interpretations of the courts.").
213. S. 1041, llOthCong. § 1 (2007).
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authorization cards.214 It is refreshing to see labor law issues once again
taking center stage, but this proposal fails to help construction workers
because it addresses only Board elections and card checks in the 9(a)
context. 215 Oddly, while employee free-choice reemerges on the
political landscape, none of the players have focused on its major
exception.
B. Proposed CongressionalAmendments: Striking a Balance Between
Union Representation and Ensuring Construction Workers' Right to
Choose
This article proposes a four-part amendment to section 8(f) that,
broadly put, will allow 8(f) agreements to facilitate representation in
circumstances not otherwise amenable to Board elections or card checks,
while still providing construction workers the freedom to choose or
refrain from choosing union representation. Further, to keep abreast of
the current construction industry's unique nature, such as its continuing
use of local hiring halls, this article proposes that 8(f) unions be afforded
minority bargaining rights to continue representing their members even
in the event of decertification.
1. Scope of 8(f) Agreements: Limited to Individual Projects
First, section 8(f) should be amended to limit prehire representation
to the terms of the initial 8(f) agreement.216 This limited scope would
further Congress' initial intent of permitting construction employers and
unions to enter into a bargaining relationship only where traditional
Board elections and 9(a) card checks are not feasible. Any successive
agreement thereafter should be predicated on a card check or Boardcertified election to establish that the 8(f) union enjoys the support of a
majority of the employees under the agreement.
This proposal,
therefore, ensures that 8(f) unions may represent construction workers
during individual projects that do not allow the time for Board elections
and card checks, while also ensuring that the workers have the
opportunity to choose their own representatives, through traditional
section 9(a) procedures, once the bargaining relationship becomes long214. Id. § 2(a).
215. Id. § 4(b)(2)(B).
216. Previously, academics have similarly urged that section 8(f) be limited to project
agreements.

See Mills, supra note 9, at 69; Murphy, supra note 36, at 1031 ("In the project-by-

project employment setting, there is little potential of adverse effect upon employee freedom of
choice resulting from a pre-hire agreement .... ").
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term.
2. Decertification Posting and Card Check
The next two proposals concern the 8(f) decertification procedure.
First, construction employers should be required to post a notice
providing basic decertification information, such as contact information
for the applicable NLRB Regional Office, so that the construction
workers who may wish to decertify the 8(f) union are able to easily find
the necessary procedural information. This notice will be limited to
basic NLRB contact information, so that it is nationally consistent and
the construction employer cannot be accused
of unlawfully providing
2 17
assistance to the decertification process.

Second, the decertification of an 8(f) union should be permitted
where a majority of employees has signed decertification cards. As
noted above, currently, employees may decertify an 8(f) union only in a
Board-certified election.2 18 However, assuming that 8(f) agreements are
limited to individual projects, a Board election will not be feasible due to
time constraints. Instead, employees wishing to decertify the 8(f) union
should be permitted to circulate de-authorization cards.
Critics may contend that these proposals will encourage employees
to decertify their 8(f) union. However, assuming that Congress and the
Board are correct, and 8(f) unions enjoy the majority support of the
employees they assign from their hiring halls for specific projects, the
employees will have no incentive to break their tie with their union and
hiring hall. 219 Rather, these proposals are intended to assist those
employees discontent with the 8(f) union, either because they do not
wish to be represented by the union or because, as in Garner/Morrison,
they do not wish to be represented by the union that their employer has
chosen for them.220

217.

See, e.g., Cintas Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 943, 954-56 (2005) (noting that the employer's

assistance was lawful by merely telling its employees that it had the address of the union and the
Board in case they wanted their authorization cards back); see also Mickey's Linen & Towel
Supply, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 790, 791 (2007) ("It is well settled that an employer violates Section

8(a)(l) of the Act by 'actively soliciting, encouraging, promoting, or providing assistance in the
initiation, signing, or filing of an employee petition seeking to decertify the bargaining
representative."' (quoting Wire Prods. Mfg. Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 625, 640 (1998))); E. States
Optical Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 371, 372 (1985) ("In addition, while an employer does not violate the
Act by rendering what has been termed 'ministerial aid,' [to employees engaged in decertification

efforts] its actions must occur in a 'situational context free of coercive conduct."').
218.
219.
220.

See John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1385 (1987).
See NLRB v. Goodless Bros. Elec. Co. (Goodless IV), 285 F.3d 102, 104 (1st Cir. 2002).
See Gamer/Morrison, LLC, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip. op. at 5 (Jan. 27, 2009).
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3. Minority Bargaining Rights
The final, and perhaps most controversial, proposal is to afford
minority bargaining rights to 8(f) unions. Although construction
bargaining has become more organized in many respects, union hiring
halls and accompanying union loyalty remain prevalent in the
industry. 221 Therefore, it is extremely important that construction
workers who are tied to their union's hiring hall-and not to the
employer-retain the option to stay with their union, particularly in the
event of decertification by non-members. Under this proposal, 8(f)
unions retain minority bargaining rights to bargain on a members-only
basis, but are precluded from bargaining as the exclusive representative
of the entire unit.
Academics have recently debated the issue of minority bargaining
rights outside of the construction industry context. 222 Specifically,
Professor Charles Morris contends that minority bargaining rights were
conmon before and immediately after passage of the NLRA,2 23 and that
"it has been long established by both Supreme Court and NLRB
authority that voluntary members-only bargaining and its resulting
contracts are legal under the Act.' 224 Critics of minority union
bargaining rights contend that these rights would violate section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA,225 which prohibits an employer from treating its union and
non-union employees differently.22 6 Others complain that employers
have no statutory duty2 27 to bargain with minority unions anyway,
because this duty applies only to 9(a) unions. 28 Finally, critics may

221. See generally Allen, supra note 1, at 423 (discussing that most hiring by union contractors
is still done through informal procedures even though contracts usually state to go through hiring
halls).
222. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
tN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 26 (2005) (discussing the existence of minority bargaining rights
before and after the NLRA was passed).
223. Id. at 26, 30.
224. Charles J. Morris, Minority Union Collective Bargaining: A Commentary on John True's
Review Essay on The Blue Eagle at Work, and a Reply to Skeptics Regarding Members-Only
Bargaining Under the NLRA, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 179, 187 (2006).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"discriminat[e] in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.").
226. See, e.g., Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We
Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 137 (2003) (arguing that any agreement that only applies to union
members would violate statute 8(a)(3)).
227. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 159(a)" of the Act).
228. See, e.g., John M. True, I11,
The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in
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worry that employers will be faced with the daunting task of bargaining
with multiple minority unions representing the same unit of employees.
These criticisms should not apply to 8(f) agreements. First, as
Professor Morris points out, section 8(a)(3) has been applied by the
Board and the courts only to majority unions that bargain for and attain
better benefits for their members than for their non-members.2 29
Therefore, section 8(a)(3) will not apply to 8(f) agreements 230 because,
as noted above, 8(f) agreements are Congress' sole exception to majority
support.23 1 Second, with respect to the duty to bargain, the Board
declared in Deklewa that construction employers have the duty to
bargain with 8(f) unions during the terms of their 8(f) agreements.232
Finally, these agreements are voluntary. Thus, if an employer is faced
with multiple minority unions, or otherwise does not wish to bargain
with any minority union, its decision is simple: it will not sign the 8(f)
agreement.
In sum, these proposals are designed to modernize 8(f) agreements
to reflect today's construction industry.
While bargaining in the
construction industry may be more organized than it was in the late
1950s, the industry will never be uniformly stable; cyclical and seasonal
fluctuations will continue, and employees will continue to be hired in the
short-term for individual projects. Therefore, section 8(f) must continue
to take into account, and support, employees in a fluctuating industry.
Thus, these proposals allow for bargaining in prehire stages, while
precluding employees who maintain a long-term or otherwise stable
relationship with the employer from being represented without having a
voice. As so modified, section 8(f) will ensure that construction
workers-who would not be able to select union representation under
traditional Board mechanisms-have the right to be represented while
maintaining their right to terminate or modify that representation.

the American Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 181, 192 (2005) ("Section 8(a)(5) was
added to the original NLRA, and it does apply, as we know, 'subject to the provisions of Section
9(a)' of the Act.").
229. See Morris, supra note 224, at 192.
230. See Albuquerque Insulation Contractor, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 61, 63 (1981) (ruling that a
union's request that an employer sign an 8(f) contract did not constitute a claim for recognition as a
majority representative pursuant to section 9(a) of the Act).
231. Lowe, supra note 7, at 1717.
232. John Deklewa & Sons (Deklewa), 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1385 (1987) ("When parties enter
into an 8(f) agreement, they will be required, by virtue of Section 8(a)(5) and Section 8(b)(3), to
comply with that agreement unless the employees vote, in a Board-conducted election, to reject
(decertify) or change their bargaining representative.").
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V. CONCLUSION

The right to elect or refrain from electing a union is at the heart of
American labor law. It is therefore perplexing that this right has not
been assured for construction workers, who have been largely forgotten
by Congress over the past half-century. As the Supreme Court has
observed, "[p]rivileging unions and employers to execute and observe
prehire agreements in an effort to accommodate the special
circumstances in the construction industry may have greatly
convenienced unions and employers, but in no sense can it233be portrayed
as an expression of the employees' organizational wishes.
Bargaining in the construction industry has changed since 1959,
when Congress sought to ensure the rights of construction workers by
amending the NLRA to add section 8(f). 3 The industry has become
more organized and, to that end, the collective bargaining product has
broadened to encompass wide geographic areas and a more diverse work
force over an extensive period of time. But section 8(f) has not changed.
It still presupposes the trends of collective bargaining witnessed by
Congress in the 1950s. Therefore, 8(f) agreements must be amended to
reflect the contemporary construction industry and to preserve employee
free-choice, while remaining flexible enough to take into account, and
support, employees in a fluctuating industry. By amending section 8(f)
accordingly, Congress will ensure that construction workers, as any
other American worker, enjoy the fundamental right of choice.

233. Higdon, 434 U.S. 335, 349 (1978).
234. Lowe, supra note 7, at 1717.
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